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Abstract
The theoretical discussion on globalization has suggested that there are
linkages between democracy and trade, although the direction of influ-
ence is less certain. Formal empirical studies remain scarce, and have
often focused on the question of whether democratic regimes influence
trade policy, as opposed to the actual relationship between democracy
and trade. This paper seeks to answer the question, “Do democracies
trade more?” by applying the gravity equation to a large dataset of bi-
lateral trade data for the period 1948-1999, while taking into account the
role of democracy. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on trade
flows, but only after controlling for trade pair heterogeneity. In addition,
it makes the case for studies of this nature to draw a distinction between
trade flows in the pre- and post-1990s period of rapid democratization as
well as between developed and developing countries.
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The crossroads oif trade are the meeting place of ideas, the attri-
tion ground of rival customs and beliefs; diversities beget conflict,
comparison, thought; superstitions cancel one anogther, and reason
begins.
The Life of Greece (Will Durant)
1 Introduction
The ongoing debate on globalization has often centered around one of its pur-
ported benefits: that it fosters a greater degree of involvement by individual
citizens in the political process. In other words, it is a question of how glob-
alization promotes democracy. Insofar as international trade is a significant
indicator of the phenomenon of globalization, this suggests that there should
exist a relationship between the extent to which a country trades and its level of
democratic participation. Indeed, declarations of such linkages are widely pro-
claimed. On one hand, Bonanno (1997, p. 2) states that “[s]trengthening the
world’s trading system is one of the major keys to fostering democracy around
the world”; on the other, Engler (2003, p. 1) argues that “[free trade] will
erode key democratic norms such as workers’ rights and the ability to legislate
environmental protections.”
Yet despite the maelstrom generated in the popular press on this topic,
academic research on the links between democracy and trade remains somewhat
limited. While the empirical literature on the effects of both democracy on
economic growth as well as trade on economic growth is large and flourishing,1
relative little has been done in studying how democracy affects trade, or vice
versa.
This is not for lack of a theoretical basis, however. The literature on en-
dogenous tariff formation (Mayer 1984) predicts that trade policy formulated
under the environment of direct democracy follows the preferences of the median
voter; while extending this to a representative democracy yields an equilibrium
tariff that is a weighted mean of voters’ individually optimal tariffs (Yang 1995).
In either case, research anticipates that politically-influenced governments will,
as democracy advances, increasingly respond to the desired tariff rates of the
electorate. Consider, in a Heckscher-Ohlin world, a relatively labor (capital)
abundant country for which the initial selectorate consists of a large fraction
of capital (labor) owners. Suppose that this body is then gradually eroded
as democratization expands the proportional weight of the relatively abundant
non-capital (non-labor) owning class. Vote-maximizing governments will find
that high tariff rates—even when fully redistributed back to voters—no longer
compensate the income loss due to protection. The result is an increasing bias
toward a trade policy that maximizes electorate welfare, and hence one that
maximizes the gains from trade. In this case, democracy unambiguously spurs
trade.
1See Tavares & Wacziarg (2001) and Frankel & Romer (1999) for recent examples of each.
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More recent work on the political economy of protection (Grossman & Help-
man 1994) tells a somewhat different story. If rational policymakers maximize
a weighted sum of campaign contributions and general welfare, the equilibrium
tariff depends on the relative weights placed on each in the government’s ob-
jective function. To the extent that special interest groups are more active in a
democracy (Olson 1982), they might constitute a greater weight, and therefore
a greater level of democracy would lead to higher trade barriers. Conversely,
political competition generated in an active democracy might imply that pol-
icymakers weight more heavily general versus special interest welfare. These
models are silent as to which influence might dominate; however, empirical work
testing the protection for sale model has yielded results that are supportive of a
positive linkage between democracy and trade (Mitra, Thomakos & Ulubas¸og˘lu
2002).
Nonetheless, the discussion above overlooks the actual relationship between
democracy and trade flows. Needless to say, trade policy need not translate
directly to actual trade volumes, since the former is primarily a government-
induced policy decision while the latter, a private one. While one would expect
a high correlation between trade policy and actual trade outcomes, it is nonethe-
less interesting to examine the actual real value of trade between states, and to
see if democracy plays a role there.2
This paper seeks to answer the basic question, “Do democracies trade more?”
This research direction allows us to abstract from the interesting, but more
complex, endogeneity and causality issues that arise when attempting to study
the effects of democracy on trade. Instead, the analysis allows for an accounting
of whether the debates surrounding free trade and democracy are even justified,
and if so, whether these arguments have taken into account empirical realities
pertaining to the issue. As a result, the paper will also be able to inform the
existing policy debate.
The few empirical papers that have studied this direct effect include the work
of Dixon & Moon (1993), who analyze the effect of joint democracy on U.S.
exports; Morrow, Siverson & Tabares (1998), who, using data for major powers
over 1907–1990, test three competing arguments of the effects of international
politics on trade flows, one of which is a joint democracy hypothesis; Mansfield,
Milner & Rosendorff (2000), who analyze the effects of alternative democratic
regime characteristics on trade flows for members of the interstate system (as
classified by Singer & Small (1994)) for five-year periods between 1960 to 1990;
and Bliss & Russett (1998), who assess trade in a yearly fashion for 1962 through
1989, using bilateral dyads for the world’s top 14 exporters, each with differing
degrees of democratic political institutionalism. All find that democracy has a
2Some recent papers that have examined the indirect channel of democracy on trade policy
are Adsera` & Boix (2002), who study the effects of democracy on both trade policy as well
as the size of the public sector; Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff (2002), who present a model
that relates PTA formation with democracy; Polachek (1997), who considers the mitigating
effect of democracies on conflict via trade, and the papers by Eichengreen & Leblang (2006),
Milner & Kubota (2005), and O’Rourke & Taylor (2006), all of which directly test the linkages
between democracy and trade policy via measures such as trade openness or the level of tariff
protection.
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positive effect on trade.
This research paper contributes to the existing literature on trade policy in
three ways. First, it utilizes a very large set of trade data that is not restricted
to U.S. trade with other countries, but bilateral trade between these countries
as well. Second, the dataset employed is also very long: Observations begin in
1948 and conclude with data up to (and including) the year 1999. In addition, it
considers both binary as well as quantitative measures of democracy, as adapted
from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2003). Third, it exploits panel
regression techniques to estimate the full regression, and hence provide a richer
analysis that also takes into account country heterogeneity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the econometric model used for the present study, as well as the dataset. This
section is followed by estimation results (Section 3) and a range of extensions and
robustness checks (Section 4). A final section concludes and provides suggestions
for future research.
2 Econometric Model and Data Description
The workhorse econometric model used for this paper is the gravity model. The
gravity model is a natural candidate for examining trade flows and how these
might be affected by democracy. The basic prediction of the gravity model—
that trade between two nations varies proportionally to the (economic) size of
these countries and inversely to their distance—is one of the most enduring
relationships in empirical economics. As a result, it has been used to explore
a range of phenomena. These include the extent to which national borders
matter in trade (McCallum 1995), the effects of a common currency on trade
(Rose 2000), the role of international institutions in promoting trade flows (Rose
2005), the differences between competing theories of international trade (Feen-
stra, Markusen & Rose 2001), and the patterns of sovereign debt and lending
(Rose & Spiegel 2004). In this respect, the present paper does not depart too
far from the existing empirical literature on the determinants of trade flows.
The benchmark gravity model used was of the following form:
ln (Tijt) = α+ β1 ln (YiYj)t + β2 ln
(
Yi
Ni
· Yj
Nj
)
t
+ β3 lnDij
+ DEMOCijtθ + ln Xijδ + ln Yijtγ + εijt,
(1)
where Tijt denotes the mean real value of bilateral trade between state i and
state j at time t, Yi is real GDP of state i, Ni is its population size (and
hence YiNi is a measure of state i real GDP per capita), Dij is the great circle
distance between i and j, and Xij and Y ijt are vectors of time invariant and
time dependent controls that influence bilateral trade, respectively.3 The error
3The controls employed in this study include: Time variant binary dummy variables for free
trade agreements, currency union, and current colony status; time invariant binary dummies
for contiguity, common language, landlocked countries, island nations, land masses, common
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terms εijt are assumed to be distributed i.i.d. N
(
0, σ2ε
)
, and the key variable
of interest, DEMOCijt, is variously taken to be:
DEMOCijt =
{
ONEDEMOCijt +BOTHDEMOCijt
ln (DEMi ·DEMj)t
, (2)
where ONEDEMOCijt (BOTHDEMOCijt) is an indicator variable that take
on unity when one country (both countries) of the two-country pair i and j is
a democracy at time t, and zero otherwise, and DEMi is a continuous variable
for the level of democracy prevailing in country i, and DEM ∈ [0, 10]. Note
that since the data are for country pair observations, we restrict the coefficients
of either permutation (i’s trade with j or j’s trade with i) to be equivalent.
The trade data are drawn from the International Monetary Fund Direction
of Trade statistics. The data cover bilateral trade between 217 IMF country
codes between 1948 and 1999.4 Controls were obtained from the World Bank
World Development Indicators, the CIA World Factbook, the World Trade Orga-
nization Annual Reports, the Penn World Tables, and the IMF Annual Report of
Exchange Rate Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions. Missing observations,
where possible, were substituted with comparable equivalents from either the
Penn World Tables, the IMF International Financial Statistics, or the States-
man’s Yearbook. The democracy variable is adapted from the Polity IV dataset
(Marshall & Jaggers 2003).
3 Data Estimation and Results
We begin with a statistical description of the data. We first consider the case
where democracy is treated as a binary yes/no variable. The sample sizes for
when both countries are democracies versus when both are not are roughly com-
parable (44,912 to 45,984). The means for some key variables are summarized
in Table 1.
Interestingly, country pairs in which both countries are democratic display a
larger mean value for the logarithm of real trade, as compared to country pairs
in which both countries are non-democratic. However, due to the relatively
large standard deviations, these are unlikely to be statistically distinct. Indeed,
this result might entirely be driven by the relatively higher wealth levels in
democratic nations (compare the means of log GDP per capita in the two cases).
Further insight into this relationship can be seen by comparing cross correla-
tions (Table 2). Evidently, the correlation between economic size and trade flows
is stronger for democratic trading pairs compared to nondemocratic pairs—more
colonial occupier, common colonial history, and common nation status; and a continuous time-
variant variable for trade openness. The control variables as well as data sources are discussed
in fuller detail in the appendix.
4Note that IMF country codes may not refer to the typical Westphalian sovereign state:
Other than the usual suspects, these codes also include independent territories, colonies,
overseas departments, and newly-independent states of former countries.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics†
Both democratic Both nondemocratic
Log real trade 11.724 9.257
(3.24) (3.06)
Log real GDP 49.432 47.356
(2.52) (2.21)
Log real GDP/capita 16.946 15.025
(1.38) (1.42)
Log distance 8.208 7.920
(0.88) (0.88)
N 44,912 45,984
†
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
than one and a half times stronger. However, these simple correlations mask
time-series effects; after all, trade exploded worldwide after the second World
War.
For instance, consider the trading relationship between the United States
and Canada, two countries with a long history of strong democratic rule, and
sharing geographical proximity. Over the postwar period, the most distinct
feature concerning average trade flows between the pair is the clear rising trend:
Average trade flows were $74.46 million in 1948 (in constant 1984 U.S. dollars),
and this peaked at $1.1 billion in 1999 (Figure 1(a)).
Next, consider the trading relationship between the following two nondemo-
cratic countries—China and Myanmar—similarly located in geographical prox-
imity to each other. Average merchandise trade between the pair exhibit con-
siderably more variation: Trade plunged following Mao’s Cultural Revolution
in 1967 (finding its nadir at $0.1 billion in 1969), before rising through most of
the 1980s and 90s. By the end of the 1990s, trade had reached new highs of
more than $2 million a year (Figure 1(b)).
We now move on to examine the descriptive statistics for the case where
democracy is treated as a continuous term. Simple scatter plots of the data
reveal no distinct patterns. The graphs of the value of bilateral trade against
the continuous democracy variable for the years 1965 and 1995 are shown in
Figure 2 below. This preliminary analysis thus hints to the possibility that,
contrary to the existing empirical literature, there seems to be no relationship
between democracy and trade.
This conclusion may be premature, however. In particular, the graphs only
display a snapshot of patterns in the data. In order to yield more meaningful
conclusions, as well as exploit the richness of the panel dataset, we proceed to
more rigorous empirical analysis.
Table 3 presents the benchmark regressions for the pooled dataset under
several alternative specifications. These are: (B1 ) The regression in (1) with
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Figure 1: Trade flows between both democratic and both nondemocratic trading
pairs.
binary indicators for trade pairs in which both countries are democracies and
for trade pairs in which only one is a democracy, as summarized by the upper
specification in (2); (B2 ) The same regression as (B3 ), but with quadratic terms
for both log GDP and log GDP per capita; (B3 ) The regression in (1) with the
continuous measure of democracy, as given in the lower specification of (2);
(B4 ) The same regression as (B3 ), but with quadratic terms for both log GDP
and log GDP per capita.
We first consider the regressions with the binary indicator variables for
democracy (specifications (B1 ) and (B2 )). Interestingly, the OLS results sug-
gest that, in either case when both countries are democracies or where only
one is a democracy, there is less trade between these two countries. These co-
efficients are significant for both specifications, and for specification (B1 ), the
coefficient for the one democracy dummy is significant at the 5 percent level.
This result is in stark contrast to the results of previous studies, all of which
find a positive relationship between democracy and trade, using much of the
same controls.
Moving on to the regressions with the continuous measure of democracy
(specifications (B3 ) and (B4 )), the results are in line with the basic results
of the first two specifications. That is, the greater the level of democracies in
nations that form a trading pair, the less these countries trade with each other;
indeed, the results indicate that these nations trade between e−0.093 ≈ 0.91
and e−0.082 ≈ 0.92 times, or about 8–9 percent, less. Note, however, that the
coefficient for specification (B4 ) is insignificant at the 10 percent level.
Why this apparent incongruity with earlier studies? This could be due to
two possible reasons. First, the larger dataset, which includes not just bilateral
trade between developed (often democratic) countries and developing (often
non-democratic) countries, is able to provide a contrasting result that is not
captured when employing a dataset that does not fully capture variable changes
across space as well as time. Second, and related to the first, the differences
could arise due to trade-pair heterogeneity that is not well captured by simple
OLS. In order to conclusively pin down the relationship between democracy and
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Figure 2: Relationship between democracy and trade, 1965 and 1995.
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Table 3: Benchmark regressions for bilateral trade flows†
(B1 ) (B2 ) (B3 ) (B4 )
Log real GDP 0.949 0.717 0.951 0.764
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.26)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.26)∗∗∗
Log real GDP 0.495 -0.468 0.476 -0.428
per capita (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.28)∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.27)
Log distance -1.112 -1.081 -1.107 -1.080
(0.03)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗
Both democracies -0.183 -0.189
(0.04)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗
One democracy -0.129 -0.080
(0.06)∗∗ (0.07)
Log democracy -0.018 -0.014
(0.01)∗∗ (0.01)
R2 0.708 0.708 0.708 0.707
N 54654 54654 54654 54654
†
Notes: Standard errors robust to country-pair clustering reported in parenthe-
ses. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5
percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level. Only selected
controls are reported, although all variables discussed in the data appendix were
included.
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trade, therefore, we turn to panel regression techniques that are able to distill
out this heterogeneity.
Table 4 displays the mixed model estimates for:(P1 ) The binary democracy
variable as regressor using the fixed effects model;5 (P2 ) The random effects
model with a GLS estimator for the binary democracy variable; (P3 )–(P4 ) The
specifications in (P1 ) and (P2 ), respectively, with GDP interacted with the
dummy for one democracy as an additional control; (P5 )–(P6 ) The specifica-
tions in (P1 ) and (P2 ), respectively, with GDP interacted with the dummy for
both democracies; (P7 )–(P8 ) The specification in (P1 ) with GDP per capita
interacted with the dummy for one democracy and both democracies, respec-
tively.
Although both fixed as well as random effects models were estimated, Haus-
man tests indicate that the fixed effects model is preferred (χ2 = 2009.2, p =
0.000). However, since fixed effects necessitates the exclusion of the time-
invariant distance variable—an important control in the gravity model—we
report both specifications for our results for (P1 )–(P6 ). To economize on
space, specifications (P7 ) and (P8 ) report only the estimates for the fixed ef-
fects model, although there were no qualitative differences for the corresponding
random effects estimates.
The results in Table 4 are more in line with that of earlier studies. Consider
first specifications (P1 ) and (P2 ). The dummy for when both trading partners
are democracies is significant and positive, indicating the fact that democracies
tend to trade more with one another. Although the dummy for one democracy
is also positive, it is insignificant in both specifications. Likewise, the coefficients
for the both democracies dummy is also positive and significant for specifications
(P3 )–(P4 ) and (P7 )–(P8 ). Based on these results, country dyads that are
comprised of both democracies appear to trade more with each other. The
coefficients range between [0.066, 0.946] times, or 6.8–146.2 percent, more.6
Hence, once we control for the heterogeneity of countries in this richer
dataset, we obtain results that corroborate those of earlier studies in this vein;
specifically, that democratic regimes tend to trade more with each other. This
change in result underscores the importance of controlling for heterogeneity
in trading pairs, and for not drawing premature conclusions from studies that
do not control for country pair-specific idiosyncrasies. In addition, the cross-
sectional-time-series nature of the panel dataset also allows us to pinpoint the
main driver of this result: It is the increase in trade between democracies over
time, rather than across space, that is important.
This can be seen from the Hausman test results comparing (P1 ) and (P2 ).
Since the (fixed effect) within estimator essentially exploits the time-series vari-
ation in the data, our results imply that increases in trade are due to moves
toward democratic regime change (over time), as opposed to the trading behav-
5Fixed effects are introduced for countries in a given trading pair.
6The upper bound of this range should be interpreted very carefully, as it is due to spec-
ification (P8 ), which has a much larger magnitude than the others. Excluding this value
brings the range to a more modest 6.8–14.9 percent, which is within reasonable bounds for
alternative empirical models.
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ior of democracies versus non-democracies in any given snapshot in time. We
believe that the difference in the magnitude of coefficients obtained from the
fixed versus random effects models may also be attributed to this phenomenon.7
This result also corroborates our cross-correlation tabulations (Table 2), while
clarifying the otherwise indeterminate visual cues suggested by Figure 1.
The coefficients of the both democracies dummy for specifications (P5 ) and
(P6 ), however, are negative and significant. What might explain the apparent
incongruence of our results when we include the interaction terms? To under-
stand the mechanism, it is helpful to rewrite (1) in the following form:
ln (Tijt) = α+ β1 ln (YiYj)t + β2 ln
(
Yi
Ni
· Yj
Nj
)
t
+ β3 lnDij + ln Y′ijtγ
′
+
[
θ1 + θ2 × ln (YiYj)t
]
BOTHDEMOCijt + ln Xijδ + εijt,
where we have parsed out the interaction terms from the vector Yijt. Thus, the
total impact of a dual-democratic trading pair on trade flows is the coefficient
on BOTHDEMOCijt alone as well as the coefficient of the interaction term
BOTHDEMOCijt × ln (YiYj)t. Since the product of GDP is so large, this
second term in the parentheses probably outweighs the first for all observations
in the data, such that the influence of the both democracies dummy remains
positive, as found in the other specifications. When understood in this fashion,
the negative coefficients are no longer paradoxical, but rather point to the fact
that any influence of democracy on trade is heavily moderated by country size.
Intuitively, it is trade between the (economically) large, democratic country
pairs that are driving our results obtained in Table 4.8
Another estimate that deserves explanation is the negative and significant
coefficient for the interaction term between the both democracies dummy and
GDP per capita in specification (P8 ). We likewise rewrite (1) in the form:
ln (Tijt) = α+ β1 ln (YiYj)t + β3 lnDij + ln Y
′′
ijtγ
′′ + ln Xijδ
+ [β2 + β4 ×BOTHDEMOCijt] ln
(
Yi
Ni
· Yj
Nj
)
t
+ εijt.
The partial derivative of trade flows with respect to GDP per capita, which is
positive a priori, can be decomposed into the coefficient on ln (Yi/Ni · Yj/Nj)t
alone as well as the coefficient of the interaction term BOTHDEMOCijt ×
ln (Yi/Ni · Yj/Nj)t. Since BOTHDEMOCijt is a binary variable, the sum of
the coefficients is 0.281 − 0.049 = 0.232, which is positive. What the negative
coefficient on the interaction term implies, however, is that a given increase in
GDP per capita in a both-democracy country pair reduces trade (relative to
7An alternative strategy to teasing out this relationship can be found by looking at the
estimates for the between model (not reported). While most of the coefficients for the between
model are qualitatively similar, the both democracies dummy switches signs (while remaining
statistically significant); this suggests that cross-sectional variation not only does not drive
the results, it actually works against the overall finding that democracies tend to trade more.
8A similar approach can be used to justify the negative coefficient for the coefficient of the
one democracy dummy in specifications (P3 ) and (P4 ).
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nondemocratic country pairs). This suggests that democratic countries that are
relatively wealthier—but are not economically large—do not necessarily engage
in more trade with other democracies. This makes intuitive sense: Small coun-
tries tend to have a narrower production base and be more dependent on trade
in general, and so are less likely to allow political-economic pressures associated
with democracy to unduly influence trade outcomes.
Finally, the other controls that were included in the specifications were gen-
erally consistent with expected signs (although not reported). For example,
participation in a regional agreement was positive and significant across all
specifications, while policy variables such as tariff barriers and current colonial
status demonstrated a negative and significant impact. The other controls were
generally insignificant, although they often appear with the expected signs.
Table 5 displays the analogous mixed model estimates using the continuous
democracy measure. These are for: (Q1 ) Fixed effects; (Q2 ) Random effects;
and fixed and random effects estimates after the inclusion of interaction terms
with GDP ((Q3 ) and (Q4 ), respectively) and GDP per capita ((Q5 ) and (Q6 ),
respectively).
The results are not unlike the case of the binary democracy measure. Sta-
tistically significant (positive) values of the coefficient range [0.017, 0.226], or
1.7–22.6 percent. Democracies are therefore likely to trade with other democ-
racies: up to almost a quarter times more.
The negative and significant coefficient for specifications (Q3 ) and (Q4 ) may
be justified, analogous to the case above, by recognizing that the partial deriva-
tive of trade flows with respect to democracy is comprised of the coefficients for
ln (DEMi ·DEMj)t and the interaction term ln (DEMi ·DEMj)t × ln (YiYj)t,
and that the magnitude of the product of GDP sufficiently large such that the
influence of the democracy variable remains positive. As before, democracy’s
influence on trade is moderated by economic size.9
We note that not all estimates of the coefficient of the democracy vari-
able are statistically significant. In particular, the random effects models in
specifications (Q2 ) and (Q5 ) do not produce significant coefficients (actual p-
values are 0.127 and 0.468, respectively). However, as before, Hausman tests
of the two models rejects the random effects model (χ2 = 2008.7, p = 0.000
and χ2 = 1907.4, p = 0.000, respectively). This suggests again that the time-
series variation in democratic development—as embodied by the fixed effects
model—is responsible for the patterns that we observe in our results; the differ-
ences in the magnitude of coefficients for fixed versus random effects can also
be understood in this light.
4 Extensions and Robustness
This section expands on the basic model by considering a series of robustness
checks and extensions to our basic empirical model.
9The explanation forwarded before for the negative coefficient on the democracy-GDP per
capita interaction term also applies for the result in specification (Q6 ).
14
T
ab
le
5:
M
ix
ed
m
od
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s
fo
r
bi
la
te
ra
lt
ra
de
flo
w
s
an
d
co
nt
in
uo
us
de
m
oc
ra
cy
va
ri
ab
le
†
(Q
1
)
(Q
2
)
(Q
3
)
(Q
4
)
(Q
5
)
(Q
6
)
L
og
re
al
G
D
P
0.
31
6
0.
69
5
0.
31
0
0.
68
9
0.
31
5
0.
69
5
(0
.0
3)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2)
∗∗
∗
L
og
re
al
G
D
P
0.
27
2
0.
20
1
0.
23
3
0.
19
7
0.
27
5
0.
22
3
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(0
.0
5)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
7)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
7)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
∗∗
∗
L
og
di
st
an
ce
-1
.2
58
-1
.2
55
-1
.2
77
(0
.0
4)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4)
∗∗
∗
L
og
de
m
oc
ra
cy
0.
01
7
0.
00
5
-0
.6
83
-0
.2
44
0.
03
3
0.
22
7
(0
.0
0)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0)
(0
.1
4)
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
2)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
7)
∗∗
∗
L
og
de
m
oc
ra
cy
0.
01
4
0.
00
5
×
G
D
P
(0
.0
0)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0)
∗∗
L
og
de
m
oc
ra
cy
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
14
×
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
∗∗
∗
R
2
0.
04
8
0.
05
0
0.
04
8
χ
2
15
13
4
8.
08
E
+
06
8.
07
E
+
06
N
54
65
4
54
65
4
54
65
4
54
65
4
54
65
4
54
65
4
†
N
o
te
s:
H
u
b
e
r-
W
h
it
e
(r
o
b
u
st
)
c
lu
st
e
r-
a
d
ju
st
e
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
∗
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
1
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l,
∗∗
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
5
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l,
a
n
d
∗∗
∗
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
1
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l.
O
n
ly
se
le
c
te
d
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
,
a
lt
h
o
u
g
h
a
ll
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
d
is
c
u
ss
e
d
in
th
e
d
a
ta
a
p
p
e
n
d
ix
w
e
re
in
c
lu
d
e
d
.
15
First, we take a sub-sample of data selected from the time period of 1965
to 1995. Specifically, we take observations from five-year periods, beginning
with 1965, to capture changes in levels of democracy. Since levels of democracy
typically do not change significantly in a given country in short periods of time,
this approach drops potentially repetitive observations. Second, taking as given
the Huntington (1991) hypothesis of the “third wave” of democratization in the
late twentieth century, we partition the dataset into pre-1990 and post-1990
observations, when the wave petered out.
Third, keeping in mind the results from specifications (P5 ) and (P6 ) that
stress the importance of economic size in moderating the amount of trade be-
tween democracies, we consider a subset of the data in which bilateral trade
occurs within two subgroups: developed countries and developing countries.10
These subgroups allow us to uncover whether it is the observations from devel-
oped countries that drive the results of the basic model. Fourth, we consider an
alternative measure of trade barriers—trade openness—as a control, in order to
ensure that democracy is not simply acting as a proxy for trade policy.11
Fifth, we introduce a stricter definition of democracy for the binary variable,
such that only democracies that are relatively mature qualify for such a classi-
fication.12 This more specific variable helps distinguish between the impact of
mature democracies versus democracies in general, and helps determine if the
mature democracies subgroup is biasing the results of the basic model. Sixth,
we indirectly address the endogeneity problem by testing for the possibility of
misspecification. To this effect, we run additional panel regressions that con-
trol for potential omitted variables that may be correlated with indicators of
democracy.13
Seventh, we attempt to directly address the endogeneity problem in two
ways: By performing some simple Granger causality tests on a selection of the
data, in order to tease out Granger causality; and by running a regression with
democracy as a LHS variable, we seek to establish if trade flows are a significant
determinant of democracy. Last, we decompose the democracy variable into 21
separate dummy variables in order to distill the extent to which the process of
democratic development influences bilateral trade.
10The classification of developed countries follows the definition used by the IMF for indus-
trialized countries.
11For example, the democracy variable may be capturing the responsiveness of the political
system to special interest lobbying for trade restrictions, rather than the political-economic
impact of the presence of democracy per se.
12For example, in the earlier binary democracy classification, any country with competitive
elections for both the executive branch and the legislature qualifies as a democracy, while this
stricter definition requires that the chief executive(s) must face some moderate to substantial
constraints imposed by accountability groups or institutions.
13A full discussion of policy and stability controls is relegated to the appendix.
16
Table 6: Robustness checks for bilateral trade flows and democracy†
Binary democracy Continuous democracy
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Full sample 0.139∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Selected years 0.086 -0.092 0.015 -0.033
(0.05)∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.01) (0.01)∗∗∗
Pre-1990 -0.030 -0.066 0.003 -0.000
(0.03) (0.04)∗ (0.01) (0.01)
Post-1990 0.038 0.212 -0.087 0.070
(0.04) (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Developed only 0.443 0.433 0.284 0.278
(0.10)∗∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗
Developing only 0.189 0.089 0.010 -0.010
(0.06)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗ (0.01) (0.01)
Alternative 0.085 0.040 0.026 0.020
openness (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗
Strict 0.116 0.084
democracy (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗
Policy and 0.808 0.710 0.035 0.008
stability controls (0.22)∗∗∗ (0.26)∗∗ (0.07) (0.06)
†
Notes: Huber-White (robust) cluster-adjusted standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ indicates sig-
nificance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
1 percent level. Only selected controls are reported, although all variables discussed in the data appendix
were included.
Table 6 reports the various perturbations made to the basic model. Both
fixed and random effects estimates are reported, but for brevity, only the coeffi-
cients for the joint democracy dummy and the log of the continuous democracy
variable are shown.
When interpreted as a group, these robustness checks suggest that measures
of democracy are sensitive to the changes in specifications previously outlined.
While most of the coefficients remain significant, and often at the 1 percent level,
some of the coefficients for democracy actually switch signs. In particular, the
sensitivity of democracy to alternative time periods underscores the finding in
Section 3 that the time element is important. As such, these results provide
insight not just into the linkages between democracy and trade flows per se, but
also how democratic development factors into the trade picture. Nonetheless,
the overall tenor of these results is that, at least in recent history, nations with
developed democratic political institutions are likely to be more engaged in trade
with one another than are countries without such institutions. The robustness
checks thus suggest that the answer to the main inquiry of this study—whether
17
democracies trade more—is largely affirmative.
The first robustness check yields coefficients with mixed signs. In particular,
the fixed effects models maintain a positive coefficient, while the random effects
models yield negative and statistically significant coefficients. What might ex-
plain this result? Recall, a key factor driving our results in Section 3 is the time-
series nature of the data. Taking selected five-year cuts of the data smooths out
much of the dynamics of democratic evolution that is essential in understand-
ing how pairwise democracies tend to trade. Since the random effects model is
essentially a matrix-weighted average of the within and between estimates, this
subset censors the data in a way that allows the cross-sectional features—which
tend to show that democratic pairs tend to trade less, not more—to dominate
the time-series aspects. These aspects, nonetheless, remain present in the data:
Notice the positive signs when we employ fixed effects.
Another way of looking at the time series effects is to consider the sample be-
fore and after the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) ended, which
is what we seek to perform with our second robustness check. The coefficients
for most of the pre-1990 specifications—including the one that is statistically
significant—is negative, while coefficients for post-1990 estimates tend to be
positive. As such, the partitioning into a pre- and post-democratization time
frame suggests a movement over time toward both a significant as well as posi-
tive influence of democracy on trade. The anomalous result for the coefficient on
the fixed effects estimate post-1990 may be due to the increasing participation
of China (a strong nondemocracy) in world trade; this can also be seen from
the density of points on the leftmost part of Figure 2(b).
In spite of China’s significant presence in world trade, it is trade between
large, democratic countries that accounts for finding that democracies tend do
trade more. The third robustness test yields positive and highly significant
coefficients for the subsample of developed countries. In addition, the estimated
coefficients are economically significant: Trade between a pair of developed
democracies is on average about 43.2 percent more. However, the finding that
democratic pairs tend to trade more is not limited to developed economies;
even among less developed countries, democratic pairs trade an average of 14.9
percent more (restricting ourselves to statistically significant results).
In some ways, these results are unsurprising. In light of the well-known
theoretical argument that trade between democratic partners is based on ties
of interest, community and security (Bliss & Russett 1998), democratic nations
are far more likely to see confluence in their trade patterns based on these
mutual commonalities. Conversely, such ties of commonality are less likely to
be pervasive among developing nations, since trade in these nations is often
driven by purely economic considerations. This explanation justifies the smaller
and less significant coefficients for democracy in the purely developing country
subset. This check also underscores another aspect that we have discussed
before—that the ability of economically large, developed countries to be selective
with respect to their trading partners is considerably more greater than the
corresponding trade decisions of developing countries.
The results from the fourth robustness test demonstrate that it is unlikely
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that democracy is acting as a proxy for trade policy in general. The coefficient
for trade openness is positive and significant at 1 percent level (not reported),
while both measures of democracy are positive and significant. Although not
reported, the one democracy dummy is also positive and significant at 1 percent
level. This implies that democracy exerts a first-order effect on trade, one that,
while possibly influencing trade via the commercial policy channel, also captures
some political-economic dynamic that is inherent in the nature of democratic
policymaking. This could well be in the form of foreign policy; after all, the em-
ployment of trade sanctions is a relatively common strategy for meeting foreign
policy objectives determined by the state apparatus.
The fifth check, which uses a stricter definition of democracy, suggests that
our somewhat arbitrary definition of what constitutes a democratic country is
not critical. This test suggests that it is not only the large, democratic coun-
tries that drive our results; these large countries also have a strong democratic
tradition, as captured by a stricter definition of democracy. Hence, while the
third wave may have created a large number of newly democratic states that
are engaged in more trade over time, the ones that have been democratic for
the longest time (or the ones that embrace democracy most strongly) are the
ones that are also engaged in the most trade.
Similarly, it appears that even after controlling for the political-economic
environment via the inclusion of controls for policy quality and political stabil-
ity (robustness test six), trade flows are still higher for democracies (although
this result is not statistically robust for the continuous democracy measure).
Two points should be noted, however. First, these controls are proxied by im-
perfect measures—policy quality by a corruption index and political stability
by a government crisis dummy—and so the weaker significance of some coef-
ficients do not necessarily negate the earlier results. Second, it is difficult to
establish ex ante how policy quality and political stability might be influenced
by democratic outcomes. After all, notoriously non-democratic nations such as
Indonesia, Peru, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates have enjoyed long
periods of stability and growth, while others such as Argentina, Iraq, Myanmar,
and Zimbabwe have not had such fortune. Likewise, the policy choices of the
ruling elite in non-democratic countries are often idiosyncratic, so that a singu-
lar directionality may be difficult to isolate. In spite of these shortcomings, the
controls included in this check seem to reinforce the linkages between democracy
and trade flows.
Overall, while it is possible to construe additional controls to include in the
model, the resulting signs of the coefficients and levels of significance of the data
suggest that the linkage between trade and democracy is sound, even when basic
perturbations to the econometric specification is made.
The seventh check for robustness concerns direct tests for the endogeneity of
the democracy variable. First, we consider Granger causality tests on data for
bilateral trade between two democracies (the U.S. and the U.K.), one democracy
and non-democracy (the U.S. and Singapore) and two non-democracies (China
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and Singapore). The estimation was of the form[
DEMt
Tt
]
=
[
η0
φ0
]
+
[
η11 η11
φ11 φ12
] [
DEMt−1
Tt−1
]
+
[
η21 η21
φ21 φ22
] [
DEMt−2
Tt−2
]
+
[
Z1t
Z2t
]
+
[
υ1t
υ2t
]
,
(3)
where Zit is a vector of exogenous variables populated by controls for openness,
output, wealth, and distance, and υit are i.i.d. error terms.
The first subsample was for the years 1948 to 1999, and the second was
from 1959 to 1999 (with a gap), and the third was from 1981 to 1997. The
results did not reveal Granger causality in either direction, and experimenting
with different lag times did not change the findings.14 Although somewhat
discouraging, this test stresses the importance of exploiting the rich dataset to
reveal patterns in the cross-sectional data that are otherwise obscured by purely
time-series analysis.
Second, we consider a fixed effects model of the form15
ln(DEMi ·DEMj)t =ρ1 ln(DEMi ·DEMj)t−1 + ρ2 ln(DEMi ·DEMj)t−2
+ ρ3 lnTijt + Iωij + WitΩ + ξij ,
(4)
where ωij captures the (pairwise) individual fixed effects, ξij is the i.i.d. error
term, and Wit is a vector of control variables that include the controls employed
in GDP, GDP per capita, education, urbanization, and population size.16 The
regression was estimated for 5-year periods, with a total of 16,903 pairwise
observations.
The Hausman test rejects the random effects model (χ2 = 206.2, p = 0.00),
and so we limit our discussion to the fixed effects model. Estimated coefficients
(not reported) were all significant at 10 percent level and consistent with the
signs in Barro (1999), with the exception of population (which had a nega-
tive coefficient and was significant at 10 percent), the primary education gap
(insignificant), and trade (insignificant). The coefficient for bilateral trade is -
0.0064, with a standard error of 0.060. Hence, we obtain some weak evidence in
14These negative results may have been mitigated somewhat with the application of Granger
causality tests for panel data. However, the technique is still in its infancy, and hence esti-
mation of this nature is left for future research. See Hurlin & Venet (2003) for a discussion of
theoretical work in this vein.
15The main drawback of our approach here is that (4) is somewhat atheoretical. While
there exists a literature on the economic determinants of democracy (Acemoglu, Johnson,
Robinson & Yared 2006; Barro 1999), empirical models are generally based on estimating an
equation of the form
DEMit = ρ1DEMit−1 + ρ2DEMit−2 + ρ3DEMit−1 + WitΩ + ξit,
for which the unit of analysis is the country-year observation, rather than country-pair-year.
We have chosen to proceed in this fashion to retain consistency with the flavor of our approach
in (1), while keeping in mind that, unlike the gravity model, there is no strong theoretical
basis for an empirical model based on combined pairwise levels of democracy.
16Controls are described in greater detail in the appendix.
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support of trade not being a determinant of democracy. Although this approach
is imperfect, this regression represents a second attempt to address the endo-
geneity problem, and suggests that causality flows from democracy to trade, not
the other way round. Nonetheless, the weak power of both tests emphasizes the
need for all empirical results of this nature to be founded on a sound theoretical
basis.
Table 7: Influence of democratic devel-
opment on bilateral trade flows†
(D1 ) (D2 )
Log real GDP -0.009 0.322
(0.03) (0.02)∗∗∗
Log real GDP 0.724 0.421
per capita (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗
Log distance -1.303
(0.04)∗∗∗
DD00 -0.323 -0.423
(0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗
DD05 -0.473 -0.541
(0.09)∗∗∗ (0.09)∗∗∗
DD10 0.021 -0.083
(0.05) (0.05)∗
DD15 0.062 -0.086
(0.06) (0.06)
DD19 0.073 -0.080
(0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.176
χ2 11445
N 139,643 139,643
†
Notes: Huber-White (robust) cluster-adjusted
standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ in-
dicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ in-
dicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗
indicates significance at 1 percent level. Only
selected variables and dummies are reported.
How important is democratic development in influencing bilateral trade?
This is the question that the eighth robustness check seeks to answer. Table 7
provides estimates for both the: (D1 ) Fixed effects and (D2 ) Random effects
estimation for the case where democracy is decomposed into 21 separate dummy
variables (DD00–DD20), with one corresponding to each cumulative democratic
level in the trade pair. This strategy allows the comparison of how different
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levels of democratic development affect bilateral trade, and provides some clues
as to whether there is a “threshold” level of democracy in a trading pair for
which trade flows experience a significant boost. In the interests of conserving
space, only selected dummies are reported.17 To avoid perfect multicollinearity,
the final dummy DD20 was dropped from the regression.
In general, the lower cumulative democracy dummies possess a negative
coefficient—indicating that low levels of democratic development have a neg-
ative effect on trade in these trading pairs. For (D2 ), the first cumulative
democracy dummy for which the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero is
DD17; for (D1 ), the coefficient actually turns positive for DD15, and is followed
by three more positive, coefficients (for DD17–DD19; with DD16 being negative
but insignificantly different from zero). Since both countries must be at least
moderately democratic in order to attain a cumulative democracy score of 15
(recall DEM ∈ [0, 10]), this test suggests that the level of democratic devel-
opment tends to boost trade only for bilateral trading relations between states
that display a fairly strong democratic tradition.
5 Conclusion
In closing, we return to the central question that motivated this paper: Do
democracies trade more? The answer, at least within the context of this present
study, is a qualified yes. Trade fosters the fertilization of ideas, and democracy is
surely one of them. This finding has been demonstrated using the gravity speci-
fication for a very large panel dataset together with panel regression techniques.
To that end, this study has upheld the findings of earlier studies that demon-
strate that democracies are more likely to trade with each other. It has, however,
also shown that this result is dependent on several key assumptions. The key
democracy variable seems to be sensitive to alternative renderings of time pe-
riods and cross sections—in the sense that the time series aspect of the data
appears to drive the result—and democracy is also moderated by, inter alia, eco-
nomic size. As such, a one-size-fits-all theory of democratic processes and their
political economic influences on trade flows and trade patterns is unlikely to be
fruitful. Instead, future theoretical research should distinguish between the mo-
tivations of trading nations based not just on their broad political-institutional
structures, but also on their level of economic development as well as global
economic trends.
Future theoretical research would naturally fall along the lines of attempting
to build a more coherent model of how democracy affects trade outcomes. Ex-
isting research, as reviewed earlier, seldom provide an explicit basis for democ-
racies affecting trade outcomes. Given the generally strong empirical evidence
that suggests that the effects of democracy might be first order instead of second
order, theoretical models of trade should consider explicitly accounting for this
17In the random effects specification, all dummies, except DD15, DD17, and DD19 were
significant at the 5 percent level. For the fixed effects specification, the dummies DD2, DD8,
DD10–DD16, and DD19–DD19 were not significant at the 10 percent level.
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characteristic, instead of treating such outcomes as exogenous, as Grossman &
Helpman (1994) do. Clearly, any model to this effect should also allow for het-
erogeneity between developed and developing countries, and, if possible, take
into account the role of constraints and influences imposed by the external en-
vironment. In this regard, Mansfield et al. (2000) is an important step forward
in this direction. (O’Rourke & Taylor 2006) also develop a model premised on
a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin world.
Future empirical research would proceed in attempting to further weed out
the endogeneity problem by implementing alternative methodologies to control
for causality and/or tackle the causality problem head on. This could involve
implementing a more complete Granger causality method than that attempted
here, one that is amenable to panel data (as discussed by, for example, Hurlin &
Venet (2003). Alternatively, one could employ instrumental variable techniques.
This would involve introducing democracy as a left hand side variable, employing
Logit/Probit to obtain predicted estimates of binary democracy (such as those
introduced in Section 4), and using these predicted values as instruments for
democracy. The drawback of this strategy—and the main reason why we have
not chosen to pursue it for this paper—is that this is likely to significantly
reduce the sample size. Eichengreen & Leblang (2006) have recently taken
a stab at establishing identification through instruments, but this has been
limited to trade openness, as opposed to volume. The paucity of both aspects
of research—theoretical as well as empirical—suggests that much remains to be
done.
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Appendix
This appendix discusses in some detail the various controls employed for both
the benchmark regressions as well as the regressions used in the robustness
testing section of the paper. It also discusses in greater detail the data sources.
The vectors for controls are as follows:
Xij =

Border
Lang
Landl
Island
Mass
ColOcc
ColHist
Nation

, Yijt =

FTA
CU
CurCol
Open
 , (A.1)
where the time invariant terms are: Border is a binary variable which is unity
when the trading pair share a contiguous border, and zero otherwise; Lang is a
binary variable which is unity when the trading pair share a common language,
and zero otherwise; Landl ∈ [0, 2] is the number of landlocked countries in a
trading pair, Island ∈ [0, 2] is the number of island nations in a trading pair;
Mass is the combined land area of the trading pair; and ColOcc, ColHist and
Nation are binary variables which take on unity if either nation in the pair
were ever colonized, shared the same colonizer, or are part of a common nation
during the sample, respectively.
The time-variant terms are: the binary variables FTA, CU and CurCol,
which take on unity when the trading pair belong to a regional trading agree-
ment, a currency union, or are both colonies at time t, and zero otherwise; and
a measure for openness. Throughout most of the paper, this measure was taken
to be applied import duties. The robustness section applied instead a measure
derived from
Opennesst =
Importst + Exportst
GDPt
,
where Importst and Exportst denote aggregate imports and exports at time t,
respectively.
The robustness section also incorporated two additional controls, one for pol-
icy quality and another for political stability. These were a continuous variable
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for extent of corruption ranging from [0, 6], used as a proxy for policy qual-
ity, and a continuous variable for major governmental crises which ranged from
[0, 5], used as a proxy for political stability. The separate dummy variables used
in (D1 ) and (D2 ) corresponding to the cumulative democracy value were gen-
erated from the sum of the two continuous democracy measures for the country
pair, with a value of unity assigned to DDv if the sum was equal to v, and zero
otherwise, for v ∈ [0, 20].
The vectors for controls for democracy as the dependent variable were:
Zijt =

GDP
GDPPC
Educ
EducGap
Urban
Pop
Oil

, (A.2)
where GDP and GDPPC are GDP and GDP per capita, Educ and EducGap
are average years of primary schooling and the gap between male and female
primary schooling (for persons aged 25 and over), Urban is the urbanization
rate, Pop is population, and Oil is an indicator variable which is unity when
the trading pair has a country that is an oil exporter, as classified by the IMF.
The full regression results are available as a log file posted on one of the
authors’ website: http://web.centre.edu/jamus.lim/research/codeipe1.txt
The trade dataset as well as the dataset for openness measures were provided
by Andrew Rose, who has made the data freely available online from his website:
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm. The democracy measures
were drawn from the Polity IV project dataset, managed by Monty Marshall and
Keith Jaggers, also available online: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity.
The control measures for policy quality and political stability were taken from
William Easterly and Ross Levine’s World Bank growth regressions data, avail-
able at: http://paradocs.pols.columbia.edu:8080/datavine/MainPage.jsp. The
education controls were taken from the Barro-Lee dataset on international edu-
cational attainment, and population and urbanization data were from the World
Bank’s Global Development Finance database.
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